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Abstract. Fraud in healthcare is widespread, as doctors could prescribe
unnecessary treatments to increase bills. Insurance companies want to de-
tect these anomalous fraudulent bills and reduce their losses. Traditional
fraud detection methods use expert rules and manual data processing.
Recently, machine learning techniques automate this process, but hand-
labeled data is extremely costly and usually out of date.
That is why unsupervised fraud detection system in healthcare is also
of great importance. However, there are almost no applications of unsu-
pervised anomaly detection based on the processing of sequential data.
To process sequential data, we propose two deep learning approaches:
LSTM neural network for prediction next patient visit and a seq2seq
model. We assume that errors of predictions correspond to anomality for
both cases and compare different ways to aggregate errors and detect
abnormality of the whole sequence. For normalization of anomaly scores,
we consider Empirical Distribution Function (EDF) approach: the algo-
rithm can work with high class imbalance problems during aggregation
of errors.
We use real data on sequences of patients’ visits data from Allianz com-
pany. The results show that both models outperform a baseline for unsu-
pervised anomaly detection. Our EDF approach improves the quality of
LSTM model. Moreover, both models provide new state-of-the-art results
for unsupervised anomaly detection for fraud detection in healthcare in-
surance.
Keywords: Unsupervised Anomaly Detection · Deep Learning · Dis-
crete Sequence Data.
1 Introduction
Healthcare is an essential part of modern society, and the modern medical system
is one of the main achievements of humankind. However, both private healthcare
companies and government healthcare systems face fraudulent cases every day,
and this number keeps increasing every year. Clinics as service providers pre-
scribe unnecessary expensive medications and procedures. Moreover, a patient
and a doctor can falsify a patient‘s diagnosis to get money for medical services.
Insurance companies have to cover such excessive bills and want to detect these
fraudulent expenses.
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Traditionally detection of such frauds was a manual routine for expensive
subject area experts [2], but now since machine learning techniques and deep
learning tools become a natural part of business processes, automatic fraud de-
tection systems were built [1].
Fig. 1. Pipeline of a proposed solution. For each patient, we have information on a code
of prescribed treatment for each visit. We recover these treatments with a generative
model and get anomaly scores on the base of errors of our generative model. Then if
the anomaly score if higher than a selected threshold, we signal about a fraud. Our
generative model can deal with sequences of various length and treatments from a
dictionary of a large size.
A machine learning guided fraud detection is faster and requires lower human
involvement, but the solution is not ideal, as the problem itself is hard. The
typical approach is to hire experts to obtain labeled data [9] and then construct
a classification model from an available imbalanced dataset with many fair and
a few fraudulent records. Due to a large amount of data and complicated fraud
patterns, only experienced auditors are able to detect fraudulent cases; thus,
data collection is expensive. Also, machine learning models are able to catch
only identified types of frauds. Moreover, as the resulting dataset is imbalanced,
we have to carefully construct machine learning involving methods aimed at the
solution of imbalanced classification problem [3,13].
Unsupervised fraud detection systems can successfully deal with these issues.
For example, the authors in [9] identify if a particular doctor conducts fraud or
not using an open dataset. They assume that doctors with common specialties
behave in the same way with similar average bills and medicine price rate [1].
So, these types of models help to detect the doctor, who is prone to fraud. The
work [2] detect frauds at the patient level using the private dataset, as there
are no open data for this problem. The model takes general information about
a patient as input: the number of medical procedures that were provided, the
average procedure bill, and so on. So, the existing approaches in healthcare exist
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but utilize only hand-crafted features [2], thus not being able to detect frauds
on the base of complex semi-structured data.
In other areas, anomaly and fraud detection methods are wider, and can
roughly be divided into four directions. The first direction considers both classic
and neural network supervised [1] and unsupervised Machine Learning algo-
rithms [16]. The second direction considers various probabilistic approaches [17]
and relies on an approximation of the generative distribution of the observed
data. The third direction adopts autoencoder models [22] and learn data repre-
sentations using sequence to sequence (seq2seq) architectures. The hybrid models
also exist [24]. Recently, the state of the art approaches for anomaly detection
based on sequence data are autoencoder models [23] and recurrent neural net-
works (RNN) [11].
This work advances unsupervised anomaly detection for healthcare semi-
structured data. We deal with discrete sequence variables and modify existing
anomaly detection approach to handle complex data from large dictionaries. The
main idea is to reconstruct a sequence of treatment using a generative model and
compare it to the initial one, treating reconstruction error values as anomaly
scores. To signal about an anomaly, we apply a threshold to these scores.
The raw data consist of semi-structured sequences of treatments for different
patients, plus additional features like patient‘s age, sex, etc. Treatments are
coded, so it could be interpreted as a set of pre-defined tokens. The pipeline of
the proposed solution could be seen in Figure 1.
To sum up, our contributions are the following:
– We apply unsupervised anomaly detection to fraud detection based on health-
care records.
– We adopt a classic anomaly detection approach for regression to a classi-
fication problem with a generative model for sequences of treatments. We
consider the local LSTM model for the prediction of a single token and a
sequence to sequence model based on LSTM to recover the whole sequence.
– For the first model, we provide a new normalization procedure to handle
a large dictionary size about 2000 and thus an imbalanced classification
problem with a large number of classes.
Rest of the work is organised as follows:
– Section 2 describes existing solutions of the problem.
– Section 3 describes the general scheme of proposed solution, models and
approaches of errors definition as well as aggregation strategies. Approach
to handle sequence imbalance is also in this section.
– Section 4 describes conducted numerical experiments and obtained results.
– Section 5 concludes our work.
2 Related works
There are two types of works related to the problem at hand: fraud detection in
healthcare and anomaly detection in general, especially anomaly detection for
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semi-structured sequences. For a general review of anomaly detection in industry
and healthcare look at [8], for a recent survey on applications of deep learning to
unsupervised anomaly detection, [14,4] and [12] can be useful. Here we present
the part of the research that we believe is the most relevant to our studies.
In healthcare, there is a widely-used open dataset Medicare claims data [5],
which includes aggregated information by doctors and patients. The data have
labeling of doctors: do they fraud or not? In [9] authors used Logistic Regression
and Random Forest to work with this dataset.
In [2], the authors focus on supervised detection of upcoding fraud, when
doctors replace code for an actual service with a code of a more expensive one.
For example, a procedure that lasted fifteen minutes can be coded as a more
expensive thirty minutes visit. Used data consisted of a sequence of coded visits.
The paper [1] considers unsupervised approaches to healthcare fraud detec-
tion. In particular, the authors investigate the applicability of k-nearest Neigh-
bors, Mahalanobis distance, an autoencoder, and a hybrid approach based on
a pre-trained autoencoder without labeled data as input for supervised classi-
fiers. In [18], authors use Generative Adversarial Network to detect anomalies
for healthcare providers.
Applications of supervised deep learning models also attract attention in deep
learning models [6,7]. The authors in [7] used embedding techniques and both
classical Gradient Boosting and deep learning approaches.
For unsupervised anomaly detection in general, there are clustering tech-
niques [16]: authors used the Isolation Forest algorithm, which is considered as
one of the most popular and easy in the usage of anomaly detection algorithms.
See also usage of probabilistic approaches in [17], usage of sequence to sequence
architectures in [22], and usage of hybrid models in [24].
In [11], the authors used the LSTM to predict each subsequent measurement
of the spacecraft. They proposed an automatic threshold selection to determine
an anomaly, indeed due to the mean and standard deviation of LSTM errors. It
is worth to mention that this domain of study is using raw data as input to a
neural network, which provides better accuracy compared to a model based on
processed data.
We see that no one proceeds semi-structured medical insurance data to de-
tect fraud in an unsupervised manner. Moreover, general machine learning lit-
erature lacks methods that can deal with a moderate token dictionary size for
the anomaly detection problem and, in particular, automatically select multi-
ple thresholds for a base anomaly score for each considered class label for a
dictionary.
3 Methods
3.1 General scheme
We have a set of patients with a size n. Every patient i is represented as a
sequence of observations Xi = {x1i,x2i, . . . ,xTii}, t ∈ 1, Ti. The total number
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of visits for a patient is Ti. Each vector xji is the description of a particular j-th
visit of i-th patient. xji consists of treatment type from a dictionary of size dt,
cost type from a dictionary of size dc and benefit type from a dictionary of size
db. We also pass the general information gi about the patient at each sequential
step.
The pipeline of a proposed solution is in Figure 2. Below we provide more
details of each step from this pipeline.
In order to detect whether a particular sequence has fraud visits or not, we
will measure the likelihood of the sequence p(Xi) using a seq2seq approach that
we call the Autoencoder model and a token by a token approach which we call
LSTM model. To do this, we either pass Xi through the seq2seq model and get
probabilities for each token in output pij or predict a token using all previous
tokes for LSTM model to get another vector pij . Then we calculate the likelihood
of a particular token j using the following formula: exij = 1−pxij , if xij is a true
label token or exij = pxij , if xij is a false label token, where exij is an error. We
recover through an autoencoder only a part of sequence related to treatments or
treatment types. Thus, we provide results of experiments for large (treatments)
and small (treatment types) number of classes (tokens).
To get an estimate of a sequence likelihood we, first, built either vector of
errors or a matrix of errors. Vector corresponds to the case, where errors on
only true token labels are taking into account, the matrix is consist of errors
both on true and false token labels. Secondly, we use sum/max pooling to get
a single anomaly score for a sequence. The final prediction is , we compare the
obtained score with a threshold. We select a threshold to get the recall 0.8. This
is the only number we calibrate using fraud labels, we state that our approach
is unsupervised.
3.2 Sequence models
LSTM model [10] is the most widely used type of Recurrent neural networks
(RNNs) [20]. We use LSTM architecture to get the probabilities for the next
treatment pij on the base of previous information {x1i, . . . ,x(j−1)i}. The archi-
tecture works as follows for each step j:
1. Embed treatment type, cost type, and benefit type using separate embedding
layers with trainable embedding matrices E of size d × e, where d is the
dictionary size, and e is the embedding size. Embedding size is one for all
feature types. For treatments embeddings size is 128, for treatment type it
equals 32. Concatenate these embeddings and the general information about
a customer gi.
2. Pass this concatenated vector to two successive LSTM blocks.
3. Pass the resulting hidden state to a linear layer to get probabilities of each
token pij
By applying this model for each token of initial sequence we get a set of
vector of probabilities Pi = {pij}Tij=1
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Fig. 2. General scheme of the proposed solution. We predict a sequence using a gen-
eration model and obtain errors for each token. Then we get a general anomaly score
on the base of aggregation of these errors. Applying a selected threshold, we can say
if a particular sequence of tokens is a fraud or not and identify fraudulent tokens as
tokens with highest errors.
Autoencoder model is a sequence-to-sequence architecture [21]. We learn the
model to copy a sequence, such that the generated sequence is as close to ini-
tial as possible. The intuition is that the network learns the representation of
sequences structure, so it would be difficult to recover fraudulent sequences with
unexpected treatments inside.
The model consists of an encoder and a decoder. The encoder constructs a
representation of an input sequence ri = E(Xi) that equals to the hidden state
of the last recurrent block. The decoder tries to generate the initial sequence for
the representation: X ′i = D(ri) ≈ Xi. As a result, the model as well as outputs
the probability distribution for every element of a sequence.
We used a bi-directional LSTM network [19] as encoder, unidirectional LSTM
network as a decoder. Both had two layers and embedding sizes 128. We also used
a context attention vector [15]. Every decoder hidden state is passed through a
dense layer by applying a soft-max function, and we obtain probability distribu-
tion for the next treatment.
3.3 Anomaly score
Given this probability distribution p(Xi) either from LSTM or Autoencoder
models, let us define anomaly score.
For every patient the output of a model is a set of vectors of probabilities
Pi = {pij}Tij=1. Length of vectors pij equals to the size of the dictionary of
treatment d.
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Feature Description
Treatment 2204 unique values
Treatment type 17 unique values (aggregated treatments)
Treatment number Prescribed number of each treatment
Factor Factor of the treatments‘ amount
Cost Cost of a particular visit
Cost Type 11 cost categories
Benefit Type 24 treatments‘ combinations types
Table 1. Features for the description of each visit of a patient
Given true labels, we define error as one minus the probability of a true
label: eijxij = 1− pijxij , where pijxij is xij-th element of probability vector that
corresponds to the index of the true token label xij . We calculate errors that
correspond to high probabilities of false labels as eijk = pijk, k 6= xij .
If we concatenate all errors for true classes eijxij we get a vector of errors
ei = {eijxij}Tij=1. If we concatenate all errors for all classes we have a matrix of
errors Ei = {eijk}j=1,Ti;k=1,d, where d is the dictionary size.
To get a single anomaly score ai from a vector or a matrix, we aggregate them
using pooling. We consider sum pooling and max pooling, as in our experiments,
mean pooling worked worse. For the vector aggregation we get:
asumi =
Ti∑
j=1
eijxij , a
max
i = max
j=1,Ti
eijxij .
For the matrix aggregation, we use Ei instead of e to extract sum or maximum.
Fig. 3. Distribution of treatment types
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(a) ROC curves of unsupervised fraud
detection models with respect to large
number of classes (treatments) and
small number of classes (treatment
types). Best ROC AUC is 0.771.
(b) PR curves of unsupervised fraud
detection models with respect to large
number of classes (treatments) and
small number of classes (treatment
types). Best PR AUC is 0.0720.
Fig. 4. Comparison of performance curve for presented algorithms
3.4 EDF approach
To normalize the probability scores and get meaningful aggregation, we trans-
form the error scores based on their empirical distribution function (EDF). EDF
is an approximation of a theoretical distribution function, based on an observed
sample for a random variable. Assume, there is a sample of n independent real
values with common distribution function e = {ei}ni=1, then EDF value for a
particular e is number of elements in the sample that is smaller than e divided
by the sample size n:
EDF(e) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
[ei < e],
where [·] is the indicator function.
Thus, as cumulative distribution function defines the probability of a vari-
able, EDF defines the relative frequency of a particular point. Therefore, having
calculated EDF for errors of every class separately, it provides a better under-
standing of which points are anomalous.
We construct d Empirical Distribution Functions for each element using a
separate validation sample not used during training. Then we transform errors
by replacing error values with EDF values for the corresponding label and get a
normalized vector eˆi or a matrix Eˆi. We aggregate these errors in the next step
in a similar way, replacing errors with EDF-normalized errors.
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Model Treatments Treatment types
ROC AUC PR AUC Precision ROC AUC PR AUC Precision
LSTM 0.743 0.0425 0.0164 0.761 0.0681 0.0170
LSTM + EDF 0.768 0.0499 0.0333 0.771 0.0601 0.0325
Autoencoder 0.771 0.0588 0.0331 0.761 0.0720 0.0319
Autoencoder + EDF 0.750 0.0483 0.0317 0.760 0.0654 0.0319
Table 2. Quality comparison of unsupervised fraud detection for LSTM and Autoen-
coder models. Precision is given for the corresponding recall 0.8. For LSTM additional
normalization provided by EDF is useful, while Autoencoder can capture all informa-
tion without EDF
4 Experiments
We compare our anomaly detectors based on recovery of treatments and treat-
ment types to each other and a baseline for a considered applied problem from
healthcare insurance.
4.1 Data
The data for the current research was provided by a major insurance company [7].
The dataset consists of 350 thousand records with anonymous patient‘s IDs and
target labels (fraud or not) for patients. About 1.5% records are fraudulent.
For each patient, we have general features age, sex, insurance type, and total
invoice amount and visit-specific features given in Table 1. In our model, visits
are coded either as treatments or treatment types. In Figure 3, we provide a dis-
tribution of treatment types concerning its prescribed frequently: the histogram
demonstrates a strong class imbalance.
4.2 Results
Metrics. The problem at hand is an imbalanced binary classification, so we use
traditional metrics like ROC AUC and area under precision-recall curve PR
AUC, where positive samples are the fraudulent ones. We also use ROC and PR
curves, as well as precision and recall.
Training process. We conduct experiments with sequences of treatments and
treatment types independently.
Patients have a different number of visits; thus, all sequences were padded
with zeros to the closest power of two to an initial sequence length. For the
padded elements, a network returns zeros.
The training sample includes 95% of the data, and the test sample includes
the remaining 5% of the data. We use 5% of the training sample as a validation
set to compare model performance and calculate the EDF function. The test
consists of 17000 for patients with 300 fraudulent cases. Distribution of classes
in validation, training, and test datasets are the same.
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(a) ROC AUC values with respect
to visit sequence length.
(b) PR AUC values with respect to
visit sequence length.
Fig. 5. Performance of models based on treatments and treatment types for different
lengths of sequences. The models work better than a random classifier most of the
time.
LSTM Autoencoder Isolation Forest
(Baseline)
Recall Precision Recall Precision Recall Precision
Treatments 0.80 0.0333 0.80 0.0331 0.07 0.08
Treatment types 0.80 0.0325 0.80 0.0319 0.06 0.06
Table 3. Comparison of the proposed models and a baseline. We present result for
our models LSTM and Autoencoder and for a baseline Isolation Forest. For Isolation
Forest we can’t reach Recall 0.8, so we present precision for the maximum possible
value of recall. The best combination of precision and recall is marked in bold. Our
models are better, than a baseline
The training process consists of 100 epochs for the LSTM model and 70
epochs for the Autoencoder model. We use the Adam optimization algorithm and
a cross-entropy loss. An initial learning rate is 0.001 for LSTM model; 3× 10−6
and 10−6 for treatments and treatment types respectively for autoencoder model.
Exponential learning rate decay with a coefficient 0.95 is used. We train the
LSTM network in the end-to-end fashion. Parameters at the first iteration are
initialized randomly.
The used best hyperparameters come from cross-validation for training data
and are given below. Embedding size is one for all feature types, for treatments,
it is 128, and for treatment types, it is 32. Batch sizes are 128 for Autoencoder
and 256 for the LSTM model. For treatment models, we use sum aggregation
for a matrix of errors with EDF for the LSTM model and sum aggregations for
a matrix of errors for the Autoencoder model. For treatment types, we use sum
aggregation for the matrix of errors with EDF for the LSTM model and sum
aggregations for a matrix of errors for the Autoencoder model.
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Results. A comparison of quality for both models with and without the EDF
approach for the best parameters and aggregation strategies are in Table 2.
Precision is calculated with the expected recall 80%. Corresponding ROC and
PR curves are in Figures 4, PR curve. LSTM and Autoencoder models provide
similar quality of anomaly detection with ROC AUC 0.77. For a large number
of classes in LSTM model, the difference in precision are ∼ 1.7%; for a small
number of classes is ∼ 1.5%. There is no difference in the Autoencoder model
either with large or small number of classes. We also examine dependence of
ROC AUC, PR AUC on the lengths of visits sequence. They are in Figures 5a
and 5b respectively.
In Table 3 we present a comparison with the Isolation Forest Algorithm
based on Word2Vec embeddings of tokens for treatments sequences. Since the
algorithm returns class labels, we compare recall and precision values.
5 Conclusion
We investigate the unsupervised anomaly detection problem. The applied prob-
lem is from healthcare insurance, and the data is semi-structured sequences.
We present unsupervised anomaly detection algorithms for semi-structured
data never used before in the healthcare industry and compared them. Moreover,
we propose an approach to natural normalization of errors based on the Empiri-
cal Distribution Function for better handling class imbalance within tokens. On
top of these errors, we examine various aggregation strategies to provide a single
anomaly score for a sequence.
The overall quality of anomaly detection is similar for various LSTM and
Autoencoder models and a various number of classes. Both models outperformed
reasonable baselines, and thus provide a new baseline. The usage of normalization
further increases the quality of the LSTM model.
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